Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed since 1974, following a Turkish invasion in Cyprus triggered by a short-lived Greek coup. Today, Cyprus is divided into two zones: the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus to the south, which covers two-thirds of the country and is inhabited by Greek Cypriots, and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which covers the remaining third of the island and is inhabited by Turkish Cypriots.

To defend its interests over the oil and gas, the Cypriot government signed “exclusive economic zone agreements” with both Egypt and Israel, and has given various exploration and exploitation licences to international companies. In response, the TRNC has signed its own agreement with the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation.

While the brinkmanship of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - who has said he will not accept reserves being exploited by Greek Cypriots - has made headlines, Faustmann says the Cypriot government bears equal responsibility for the crisis.

“The Greek Cypriots made it very clear from the beginning that they had exclusive rights to explore for oil and gas to the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots,” says Faustmann. “They made very ambivalent statements concerning revenue-sharing too.”

Precisely what the two are fighting over is up for debate. As things stand, Cyprus lacks the infrastructure necessary to export gas to Europe. A pipeline to connect the fields through Italy has been proposed but analysts say it is too expensive and unlikely to attract investment given the relatively minor reserves that have been discovered to date. Even

if it is built, few think the gas could be offered at a competitive price by the time it passes through the pipelines and reaches European countries.

“It is a lot of noise about very little,” says Faustmann. “The findings might be significant for Cyprus but they’re not significant for Europe. There is a lot of political struggle but if you look at the economic viability we are short of a big find.”

That said, further escalation is likely in the short-term, with forthcoming presidential elections expected to up the stakes in Turkey, which is also in a dispute with Greece over contested islands in the Aegean Sea and is fighting a war against American-backed Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Faustmann says these issues are all connected.

“Erdogan is in pre-election mode and is desperate to win for his physical, not just his political survival,” he says. “His campaign will be full of external enemies and crisis situations where he can pose as the patriot and pander to nationalist sentiments. You can expect extremely harsh responses on any front simply to score goals. After the election he might de-escalate, but for now I expect an increase in tensions.”

Talk of open conflict between Turkey and Cyprus is unlikely however. Ankara’s hands are currently full with the conflict in Syria’s Afrin province and the government is unlikely to risk its economic ties with Europe over a relatively minor amount of gas.

Greek Cypriots also “have no military capacity” to escalate the situation, adds Faustmann. “They have no navy. If the Turks do something, the Greek Cypriots cannot militarily respond, it is just not an option.”

To end the crisis, some have recommended the creation of an interim committee where both Cypriot communities can make joint decisions on the exploration and exploitation of gas and future revenue-sharing.

But this remains unlikely. What is really needed, says Faustmann, is a genuine solution to the decades-long animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots that has plagued this small island.

“Without a solution to the Cyprus problem, the hydrocarbon issue cannot be solved,” he says.